Mikroökonomische Theorie (Nöldeke)

Frahm, G. and Hartmann, L. (2024) ‘Some Notes on Savage’s Representation Theorem’, Theory and Decision [Preprint]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-10003-1.

Peña, Jorge, Heifetz, Aviad and Nöldeke, Georg (2024) ‘The shirker’s dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups’, Theoretical Population Biology, 155, pp. 10–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2023.11.001.

Nöldeke, G. and Samuelson, L. (2024) ‘Investment and competitive matching’, in Handbook of the Economics of Matching. Elsevier (Handbook of the Economics of Matching), pp. 125–222. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesmat.2024.10.005.

Hartmann, L. (2023) ‘Strength of preference over complementary pairs axiomatizes alpha-MEU preferences’, Journal of Economic Theory, 213. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105719.

Baccelli, J. and Hartmann, L. (2023) ‘The Sure-Thing Principle’, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 109. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102915.

Fershtman, D., Szabadi, B. and Wasser, C. (2023) ‘Efficient resolution of partnership disputes’, RAND Journal of Economics. 13.10.2023, 54(4), pp. 543–569. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12450.

Frahm, Gabriel and Hartmann, Lorenz (2023) ‘Erratum to “Savage’s P3 is Redundant”’, Econometrica, 91(3), pp. 33–33. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta21641.

Hartmann, L. and Kauffeldt, T.F. (2023) ‘Binary Diversification Characterizes Exact Capacities’, SSRN Electronic Journal [Preprint]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4487001.

Peña, J. and Nöldeke, G. (2023) ‘Cooperative Dilemmas with Binary Actions and Multiple Players’, Dynamic Games and Applications, 13, pp. 1156–1193. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00524-9.

Terstiege, Stefan and Wasser, Cédric (2023) ‘Experiments versus distributions of posteriors’, Mathematical Social Sciences, 125, pp. 58–60. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.003.

Wasser, Cédric and Zhang, Mengxi (2023) ‘Differential treatment and the winner’s effort in contests with incomplete information’, Games and Economic Behavior, 138, pp. 90–111. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.004.

Häfner, Samuel and Nöldeke, Georg (2022) ‘Sorting in iterated incumbency contests’, Economic Theory, 74(4), pp. 1103–1140. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01205-8.

Ilić, Dragan and Mollet, Janick Christian (2022) ‘Voluntary corporate climate initiatives and regulatory threat’, International Economics and Economic Policy, 19(1), pp. 157–184. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-021-00519-0.

Terstiege, Stefan and Wasser, Cédric (2022) ‘Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer’, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (AEJ: Microeconomics), 14(3), pp. 622–664. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200027.

Wong, Tsz-Ning and Yang, Lily Ling (2021) ‘Dynamic Expert Incentives in Teams’, Games and Economic Behavior, 125, pp. 27–47. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.005.

Hao, Hong and Wong, Tsz-Ning (2020) ‘Authoritarian Election as an Incentive Scheme’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 32(3), pp. 460–493. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820910563.

Hartmann, L. (2020) ‘Savage’s P3 Is Redundant’, Econometrica. 05.02.2020, 88(1), pp. 203–205. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17428.

Lauermann, Stephan, Nöldeke, Georg and Tröger, Thomas (2020) ‘The Balance Condition in Search-and-Matching Models’, Econometrica, 88(2), pp. 595–618. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8356.

Nöldeke, Georg and Peña, Jorge (2020) ‘Group Size and Collective Action in a Binary Contribution Game’, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 88, pp. 42–51. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.003.

Peña, Jorge, Nöldeke, Georg and Puebla, Oscar (2020) ‘The Evolution of Egg Trading in Simultaneous Hermaphrodites’, The American Naturalist, 195(3), pp. 524–533. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1086/707016.

Terstiege, Stefan and Wasser, Cédric (2020) ‘Buyer-optimal extensionproof information’, Journal of Economic Theory, 188, p. 105070. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105070.

Ilić, Dragan, Pisarov, Sonja and Schmidt, Peter S. (2019) ‘Preaching water but drinking wine? Relative performance evaluation in international banking’, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 155(6). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1186/s41937-019-0032-8.

Ilić, Dragan and Schmidt, Peter S. (2019) ‘CEO-Löhne im Bankensektor: Die Leistung zählt’, Die Volkswirtschaft, 1 January, pp. 27–29.

Loertscher, Simon and Wasser, Cédric (2019) ‘Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships’, Theoretical Economics, 14(3), pp. 1063–1114. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2608.

Benkert, Jean-Michel, Letina, Igor and Nöldeke, Georg (2018) ‘Optimal search from multiple distributions with infinite horizon’, Economics Letters, 164, pp. 15–18. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.032.

Franke, Jörg, Leininger, Wolfgang and Wasser, Cédric (2018) ‘Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests’, European Economic Review, 104, pp. 22–37. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.02.001.

Häfner, Samuel (2018) ‘Stable Biased Sampling’, Games and Economic Behavior, 107, pp. 109–122. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.006.

Ilić, Dragan (2018) ‘Prejudice in naturalization decisions: Theory and evidence’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 150, pp. 1–18. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.005.

Nöldeke, Georg and Samuelson, Larry (2018) ‘The Implementation Duality’, Econometrica, 86(4), pp. 1283–1324. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta13307.

Peña, Jorge and Nöldeke, Georg (2018) ‘Group size effects in social evolution’, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 457, pp. 211–220. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.08.004.

Wong, Tsz-Ning and Yang, Lily Ling (2018) ‘When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion’, Economics Letters, 163(C), pp. 186–189. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.001.

Häfner, Samuel and Nöldeke, Georg (2016) ‘Payoff shares in two-player contests’, Games, 7(3), pp. 25–25. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7030025.

Nöldeke, Georg and Peña, Jorge (2016) ‘The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information’, Games and Economic Behavior, 99, pp. 71–81. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.016.

Peña, Jorge and Nöldeke, Georg (2016) ‘Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action’, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 389, pp. 72–82. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.10.023.

Lauermann, Stephan and Nöldeke, Georg (2015) ‘Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions’, Economics Letters, 131, pp. 1–4. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.023.

Nöldeke, Georg and Samuelson, Larry (2015) ‘Investment and Competitive Matching’, Econometrica, 83(3), pp. 835–896. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta12349.

Peña, Jorge, Nöldeke, Georg and Lehmann, Laurent (2015) ‘Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in spatially structured populations’, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 382, pp. 122–36. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.06.039.

Lauermann, Stephan and Nöldeke, Georg (2014) ‘Stable marriages and search frictions’, Journal of Economic Theory, 151, pp. 163–195. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.11.001.

Nöldeke, Georg and Samuelson, Larry (2014) ‘Investment and Competitive Matching’, WWZ Discussion Papers. Basel: WWZ, University of Basel (WWZ Discussion Papers, 07). Available at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/bsl/wpaper/2014-07.html.

Peña, Jorge, Lehmann, Laurent and Nöldeke, Georg (2014) ‘Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games’, Journal of theoretical biology, 346, pp. 23–33. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.12.016.

Seel, Christian and Wasser, Cédric (2014) ‘On Optimal Head Starts in All-Pay Auctions’, Economics Letters, 124(2), pp. 211–214. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.018.

Archetti, Marco (2013) ‘Evolution of polygamous marriage by maximization of inclusive fitness’, Journal of theoretical biology, 319, pp. 134–43. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.11.017.

Archetti, Marco and Scheuring, István (2013) ‘Trading public goods stabilizes interspecific mutualism’, Journal of theoretical biology, 318, pp. 58–67. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.10.022.

Wasser, Cédric (2013) ‘Bilateral k+1-price Auctions with Asymmetric Shares and Values’, Games and Economic Behavior, 82, pp. 350–368. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.014.

Wasser, Cédric (2013) ‘A Note on Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests’, Mathematical Social Sciences, 66(2), pp. 180–182. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.03.001.

Wasser, Cédric (2013) ‘Incomplete Information in Rent-seeking Contests’, Economic Theory, 53(1), pp. 239–268. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0688-5.

Archetti, Marco (2012) ‘Survival of the weakest in N-person duels and the maintenance of variation under constant selection’, Evolution, 66(3), pp. 637–50. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01477.x.

Archetti, Marco (2012) ‘Survival of the weakest in N-person duels and the maintenance of variation under constant selection’, Evolution, 66(3), pp. 637–50. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01477.x.

Archetti, Marco and Scheuring, István (2012) ‘Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment’, Journal of theoretical biology, 299, pp. 9–20. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.06.018.

Peña, Jorge (2012) ‘Group-size diversity in public goods games’, Evolution, 66(3), pp. 623–36. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01504.x.

Peña, Jorge and Rochat, Yannick (2012) ‘Bipartite Graphs as Models of Population Structures in Evolutionary Multiplayer Games’, PLoS ONE, 7(9), p. e44514. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0044514.

Archetti, Marco (2011) ‘Contract theory for the evolution of cooperation: The right incentives attract the right partner’, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 269(1), pp. 201–207. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.10.025.

Archetti, Marco (2011) ‘A strategy to increase cooperation in the volunteer’s dilemma: reducing vigilance improves alarm calls’, Evolution: international journal of organic evolution, 65(3), pp. 885–892. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.2010.01176.x.

Archetti, Marco and Scheuring, István (2011) ‘Coexistence of cooperation and defection in public goods games’, Evolution : international journal of organic evolution, 65(4), pp. 1140–8. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.2010.01185.x.

Archetti, Marco et al. (2011) ‘Economic game theory for mutualism and cooperation’, Ecology Letters, 14(12), pp. 1300–12. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01697.x.

Archetti, Marco et al. (2011) ‘Let the right one in: a microeconomic approach to partner choice’, The American naturalist, 177(1), pp. 75–85. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1086/657622.

Archetti, Marco (2010) ‘Complementation, genetic conflict, and the evolution of sex and recombination’, The Journal of Heredity, 101 Suppl 1(Suppl 1), pp. S21–33. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/jhered/esq009.

Fortunato, L and Archetti, M (2009) ‘Evolution of monogamous marriage by maximization of inclusive fitness’, Journal of evolutionary biology, 23(1), pp. 149–56. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1420-9101.2009.01884.x.

Nöldeke, Georg and Tröger, Thomas (2009) ‘Matching Heterogeneous Agents with a Linear Search Technology’. [s.n.]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1324644.

Mailath, George J. and Noeldeke, Georg (2008) ‘Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?’, Journal of economic theory, 140(1), pp. 97–125. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.001.

Nöldeke, Georg and Larry Samuelson (2007) ‘Optimal bunching without optimal control’, Journal of economic theory, 134(1), pp. 405–420. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.001.

Nöldeke, Georg and Tröger, Thomas (2006) ‘A characterization of the distributions that imply existence of linear equilibria in the Kyle-model’, Annals of finance, 2(1), pp. 73–85. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-005-0024-9.

Nöldeke, Georg and Samuelson, Larry (2003) ‘Strategic choice handicaps when females seek high male net viability’, Journal of theoretical biology, 221(1), pp. 53–9. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2003.3169.

Nöldeke, G. (2001) ‘Natural Justice and Political Stability’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 157(1), p. 152. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1628/0932456012974602.

Nöldeke, Georg and Tröger, Thomas (2001) ‘Existence of linear equilibria in the Kyle model with multiple informed traders’, Economics letters, 72(2), pp. 159–164. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00415-3.

Nöldeke, Georg and Samuelson, Larry (1999) ‘How costly is the honest signaling of need?’, Journal of theoretical biology, 197(4), pp. 527–539. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.1998.0893.

Noldeke, G and Schmidt, KM (1998) ‘Sequential investments and options to own’, The Rand journal of economics, 29(4), pp. 633–653. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/2556087.

Nöldeke, G (1997) ‘On testing for financial market equilibrium under asymmetric information’, Journal of Political Economy, 105(5), pp. 1107–1113. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1086/262107.

Noldeke, G and Samuelson, L (1997) ‘A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets’, Journal of economic theory, 73(1), pp. 118–156. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2239.

Nöldeke, G. and Schmidt, K.M. (1997) ‘Debt as an Option to Own in the Theory of Ownership Rights’, in Firms, Markets, and Contracts: Contributions to Neoinstitutional Economics. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD (Firms, Markets, and Contracts: Contributions to Neoinstitutional Economics), pp. 1–17. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46988-6_1.

NOLDEKE, G and SCHMIDT, KM (1995) ‘Option contracts and renegotiation : a solution to the Hold-Up Problem’, The Rand journal of economics, 26(2), pp. 163–179. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/2555911.

NOLDEKE, G and SAMUELSON, L (1993) ‘An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction’, Games and economic behavior, 5(3), pp. 425–454. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1024.

NOLDEKE, G and VANDAMME, E (1990) ‘Signalling in a dynamic labour market’, The Review of economic studies, 57(1), pp. 1–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297540.